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A Case Study of Piloting Emission Trading Scheme in Guangdong Province 
 
 
Abstract:  
This paper investigates how piloting programmes in China can promote local policy innovations. By 
using one of the piloting emission trading scheme (ETS) in Guangdong province as a case study, we 
argue that the main features of the piloting experiments, particularly in the climate change domain, are 
largely different from previous local marketisation experiments that dominate the reform period of 
China. Whereas previous experiments are often characterised as bottom-up or indigenous initiatives 
with strong patronage relations to the pro-reform politicians at central level, the current piloting 
programmes are often crafted in a top-down fashion that is often misaligned with local market or 
corporate interests. Hence, local policy innovations are designed, developed and brokered by the local 
state officers in order to bridge this central-local interest gap. As a result, successful implementation of 
these policy innovations largely depends on local political traditions, bureaucratic culture, and 
perceptions of distinctive development needs.  
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1. Introduction: 
As the largest greenhouse gases (GHG) emitter in the world, China announced an ambitious plan to 
curb its soaring emissions at the Paris climate change conference (COP 21) in 2015, pledging to peak 
its emissions by 2030. One of the key instruments it intends to apply to achieve this target is a nation-
wide carbon trading system to be in place by the end of 2017. Prior to this announcement, seven 
piloting emission trading schemes (ETS) had already been launched since 2013, including 5 major 
cities and 2 provinces across the country. In this regard, the lessons learnt from these local piloting 
programs can inform the successful implementation of national climate change strategy (Han et al, 
2012). Since their launch, the seven piloting ETS programs have been accumulating practical 
knowledge and experience on establishing legal and institutional frameworks for governing arguably the 
largest carbon market in the world. Such efforts would also contribute to setting up a comprehensive 
database for the measurement, registering, reporting, and validating of GHG emissions across various 
industries, as most of their carbon emissions have been poorly managed to date. The expectation is 
that carbon markets will also help to enhance corporations’ awareness of climate change and their 
skills in managing carbon assets (Liu et al, 2015; Lo, 2016; Shen, 2015). In general, these local policy 
experiments in relation to ETS and a wide range of newly emerged institutional or policy innovations 
are expected to resolve many technical and institutional challenges of applying a market-based 
governance instrument in a rather centralised political economy (Lo, 2013), and consequently to 
provide a solid foundation for the future establishment of a national-wide cap-and-trade system (Zhang, 
2015). Therefore, it is fair to argue that although the creation of carbon market and piloting trading 
programmes is a result of top-down political ambition, the implementation is a typical bottom-up 
approach where local innovations play a crucial role to its success. 
However, little is known regarding why and how the local policy innovations emerged within the local 
ETS experiment and what implications this has for climate governance. Empirical studies reveal that in 
many respects these piloting ETS programs developed highly contrasting institutional arrangements 
and regulatory frameworks (Qi et al, 2014; Wu, 2015; Zhang, 2015), ranging from the scope of 
industries to be included within the ETS, the allocation of the emission allowances, the emissions 
measurement and validation process, to the penalty system for non-compliance corporations. The 
diversity in the policy innovations in the piloting phases represents tremendous differences of economic 
context, public-private relations, and interest configurations among key governance actors in these 
piloting areas, which impose significant challenges for the central government in ‘handpicking’ 
successful experiments in the construction of a national ETS. In this paper, we seek to understand the 
key factors that lead to the policy innovations via a case study of one of the piloting ETS programs in 
Guangdong province. Based on a series of in-depth interviews with the stakeholders involved in 
regulating or participating in the current carbon trading activities in this area, plus intensive analysis of 
existing policy documents and regulations, the paper intends to answer the question of what actors and 
interests are driving local policy and institutional innovations during the piloting phase of ETS, and what 
are the implications for China’s climate governance in order to meet its ambitious emission reduction 
target by 2030.  
The paper is constructed as follows. In section two, two rather separate groups of literature are 
reviewed regarding studies of China’s tradition of local policy experiments and studies on multilevel 
climate governance experiments. The literature review aims to situate the case study in relation to the 
broader academic debate about climate governance and market instruments. Section three provides a 
historical and contextual account of Guangdong province’s ETS experiment, focusing on the distinctive 
features of the locality as a long standing pioneer of economic and marketised reforms in the past three 
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decades. Section four presents the key innovative policies and policy changes adopted by 
Guangdong’s provincial government to promote and regulate ETS. The analysis is carried out to 
understand the dynamics behind the emergence of these policies and changes. Section five provides a 
discussion of the empirical and theoretical implications of Guangdong’s innovative efforts to regulate its 
ETS pilots. Section 6 concludes with a summary of the key findings. 
2. Local climate governance and policy experiment: a review of literature 
Two bodies of literature are highly relevant to this study. On the one hand, there are a large number of 
case studies regarding local policy experiments in China’s post-Mao reform era. Most of these studies 
choose a specific policy area or piloting programme during China’s economic reform era as the cases 
for analysis, and aim to explain how local institutional innovations are developed and then adopted in 
later national policy processes. It is noted that the recent pilot ETS programmes have also attracted 
many scholars to add to this literature. On the other hand, there are a handful of studies focussed on 
experimental climate governance instruments across various geographies. Researchers have 
considered how market instruments and other instruments or initiatives led by non-state actors can be 
conceptualised as a replacement or complement to the state-led climate governance approach 
(Okereke et al 2009; Bulkeley et al 2014; Hoffman 2011) including as part of a broader climate ‘regime 
complex’ (Keohane and Victor 2011). This paper argues that it is important to situate the analysis of 
China’s ETS experiment in relation to these literatures because the experiment with market instruments 
through a cap-and-trade system is simultaneously a continuation of China’s tradition of local policy 
experimentation, and a significant part of decentralised and fragmented experiments in governing 
climate change around the globe.  
2.1. China’s distinctive policy process of local policy experiment  
There is a considerable amount of literature focusing on the role of local experiments and institutional 
innovations during China’s economic reform era (Chien, 2007; Heilmann, 2007 and 2008; Naughton, 
1994; Zhang et al, 2004; Zhu, 2012). These studies discuss the role of ‘indigenous but centrally 
controlled’ local experiments on a wide range of policy issues in pushing forward China’s economic 
transition from a centrally planned economy to a more market oriented one during the past three 
decades. They reveal that policy experiments at local level, usually in the name of piloting programs 
and experimenting (shidian 试点), form an integral part of China’s economic policy and therefore have 
a long history in China (Heilmann, 2008a). Their main purposes usually include creating political spaces 
for marketisation reforms albeit within a tightly controlled socialist ideology and political structure, and 
finding generalizable experience that can be applied by national policy making processes (Heilmann, 
2007; Zhu, 2012). According to Heilmann (2008b), the general pattern of this policy process can be 
generalised as in Figure 1: 
From the above figure, two distinctive features of China’s local policy pilots should be noted. Firstly, 
most of initial ideas for local experiments were based on indigenous novel economic activities at the 
local level that aim to enhance local living standards and welfare (Chien, 2007; Zhu, 2012). Secondly, 
such activities are pushing the boundary of economic transition towards a more market oriented 
economy, and hence may often face political resistance from conservative officers at the central level. 
Therefore, pro-reform political leaders often explicitly or implicitly endorse piloting programmes as a test 
to break through institutional and ideological inertia and legitimise these innovative practices based on 
the outcome of the experiment. Patronage relationships are therefore important to advance such 
experiments (Heilmann, 2008b; Naughton, 1994). Most of the local experiments were concentrated on 
economic policy domains, and there are a large number of case studies of local reforms and 
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innovations in the policy areas of land ownership (Ding, 2003; Zhu, 1999), marketising housing 
schemes (Zhu, 2012), developing private enterprises (Young, 1995), reforming state-owned enterprises 
(Oi, 2011; Warner, 1996), and developing China’s stock market, since these are the frontline areas for 
economic reforms. However, there is an increasing number of studies showing that this distinctive 
policy process of local policy experiments is spreading to other non-economic sectors (Florini et al, 
2012), including the newly emergent environment and climate change domain. Research on some of 
the early experiments in these domains, such as the piloting initiatives for SO2 emission trading 
schemes and low-carbon provinces and cities (Lu, 2011; NDRC, 2010; Tao and Mah, 2009; Wang et al, 
2015), reveals rather limited achievements and tremendous challenges around transferring this local 
piloting process into the environmental and climate governance areas (Khanna et al, 2014; Lo, 2013; 
Xu, 2014).  
2.2. Market instruments as a form of experiment of non-state climate governance 
Beyond the unique history and experience of market mechanisms in China, there is a broader and 
growing literature on how best to understand the emergence, form and diffusion of carbon markets 
within a broader historical context of neo-liberalism and what has been referred to as a finance-led 
regime of accumulation (Paterson, 2012; Newell and Paterson, 2010; Parr, 2012), whereby solutions to 
the climate crisis inevitably bear the hallmarks and seek to serve financial actors that are increasingly 
powerful and important to securing growth in contemporary capitalism. Other work looks at the detailed 
practices of market-making: the methodologies, practices and assemblages required to bring markets 
into being from the construction of elaborate accounting methods to enable commensurability to 
allocating property rights and governing markets (Lane, 2012; Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011).  
Considerable attention has been paid to explaining the rise of non-state climate governance or what 
has been labelled ‘transnational climate change governance’ (Bulkeley et al, 2014) providing typologies 
of the origins, form, financing and types of collaborations, networks and partnerships that have been 
emerging alongside, but often supplementing, the global climate regime (Hoffman, 2011). Focussed on 
the uneven diffusion and adoption of market instruments around the world, there is also a literature on 
‘varieties of carbon governance’ (Fuhr and Lederer, 2009; Newell, 2009). This includes case study 
analysis of different countries experience of carbon markets to date, including China (Schroeder, 2012). 
This is in addition to a broader literature on the politics of carbon markets (Stephan and Paterson, 
2011; Lane and Newell 2016), covering both their pre-history and the politics of their emergence as a 
preferred way of responding to the challenge of climate change, as well as efforts to move beyond this 
framing of viable alternatives (Stephan and Lane, 2015). 
Our case study here speaks to a number of these debates by illustrating the actors, networks, 
institutions and processes that brought an ETS scheme into being in China. We explore what this 
reveals about the process of ‘making’ a market in one of the world’s most powerful economies and a 
key contributor to greenhouse gas emissions. As well as offering an empirical analysis of initiatives 
aiming to address climate change, therefore, it also provides an interesting case study of how China’s 
unique political economy creates carbon markets. 
3. Implementing ETS experiment in a vanguard province for economic reforms 
Guangdong (formerly Canton) is a coastal province of southeast China, borders Hong Kong and 
Macau, and is home to over 107 million in 2014. Guangdong province is best known for its vanguard 
status and as the heartland of marketization experiments in China since the beginning of Deng 
Xiaoping’s ‘reform and opening-up policy’ (改革开放政策) in the early 1980s, even though piloting 
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programs and policy experiments have a long history throughout the history of CCP’s rule (Heilmann, 
2008a). Many pioneering reformist policies were first introduced in Guangdong before being adopted at 
national level. For example, one of the most significant marketised policy experiments is the 
establishment of the so-called four ‘special economic zones’ (SEZs) in 1979, among which three of 
them are located in Guangdong province (namely Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou). Later in 1985, the 
SEZ experiment was further expanded to the provincial level in Guangdong under the banner of ‘the 
Pearl River Delta Open Economic Zone’. Within these SEZs various flexible measures were designed 
for promoting the market economy, ranging from the market based pricing system to tax havens for 
foreign investments. The results of these experiments are remarkable. Prior to these reforms 
Guangdong’s per capita GDP was lower than the national average, but since then Guangdong has 
become one of the most highly developed provinces in China with much higher per capita GDP 
compared to the national average throughout the reform era (Figure 1). In 2015, its GDP reached 1170 
billion USD, accounting for over 10% of the country’s total annual GDP. Consequently, Guangdong is 
generally seen as a showcase for the success of the economic reforms, with the highest level of 
marketization among other provinces in China. Its leaders are also well known for their enthusiasm and 
dedication to pursue innovative ideas to deepen the market reforms.   
Despite Guangdong’s vanguard position in bottom-up policy innovations for economic reforms, its 
environmental governance for pollution control and cleaner production is largely in line with a traditional 
command-and control system. The central government decides the major targets for the reduction of 
the overall energy intensity of industrial outputs and the appropriate limits for specific pollutants, and 
local officers’ task is to make sure these targets are met. For example, during the period of 12th five 
year plan (2010-2015), the energy intensity for GDP and industrial output in Guangdong was required 
to be reduced by 18% and 21% respectively, which major pollutants like SO2 and NOx to be reduced by 
15% and 17%. All these top-down targets were met by quite a margin by 2015 (Guangdong 
Government, 2017). Although the command and control mode of governance appears to be effective, it 
has serious flaws in terms of its rather weak enforceability and capture by vested local interests 
(Kostka, 2015). Some of these targets are met only due to the shut-down of factories in the face of 
pressure from central government, but also because of technological upgrading in heavy polluting and 
inefficient industries. In addition, the fragmentation of the local regulatory system is another source of 
the chaotic implementation of environmental regulations, as cleaner production is largely regulated by 
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), while the pollution targets are supervised by 
the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). As a new governance area, climate change and GHG 
emissions are under the regulatory purview of the National Development and Reform Commissions 
(NDRC). As a result, the institutional design of governing climate change is developed in a rather 
parallel track with existing governance structures for cleaner production and pollution control.     
As a result, the piloting ETS program represents a departure from previous policy experiments that 
focussed mainly on promoting economic growth within the region, or traditional environmental 
governance. In addition, policies targeting controls on emissions are often believed to have constraining 
effects on economic development amid claims that the output and welfare losses under cap-and-trade 
scenarios are significantly lower than in other mandatory emission control instruments (Hübler et al, 
2014; Wang et al, 2015). Therefore, it is interesting to explore whether experiments like this ETS are 
supported by local public and private actors just as other pro-growth policy experiments were 
previously. The field study indicates a positive reaction towards ETS from most of the stakeholders 
interviewed, particularly among public actors and government officers. This is mainly because, like 
many other highly industrialised provinces, Guangdong faces tremendous challenges to rein in its 
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soaring energy consumption, air pollution and GHG emissions. In 2010, the provincial government 
announced its target to decrease its energy intensity (units of energy consumption to produce one unit 
of GDP) by 45% from 2005 level in 2020 (Guangdong Development and Reform Commission [GDRC], 
2010). The introduction of ETS has then become an integral part of the policy mix to achieve that target 
due to the co-benefits it may produce to alleviate air pollution and produce energy saving (Cheng et al, 
2015), even though most corporations were not very familiar with the concept of carbon trading when it 
was launched in December 2013. 
4. Overview of the design and construction of GD-ETS 
Among seven piloting ETS programmes, Guangdong and Shenzhen ETS are both located within 
Guangdong province. This is mainly due to the bureaucratic struggle as the political leaders of 
Shenzhen city insisted on having an independent ETS due to Shenzhen’s rather distinctive economic 
and industrial structure compared to the rest of the Guangdong province. The launch of the GD-ETS 
was based on a rather short period of preparation work started in September 2012, when the provincial 
government released the guidelines and the implementation plan of the GD-ETS. Meanwhile, a 
dedicated carbon trading exchange, China Emissions Exchanges (CEEX), was established. After a 
year of intensive capacity building and training programs between 2012 and 2013, the first detailed plan 
regarding the distribution of emission allowances were released by the direct regulatory institution, 
GDRC in November 2013. In December 2013, these allowances were allocated via CEEX. In January 
2014, the Guangdong government released the measures to regulate the operation of GD-ETS. The 
initial policy institutions and frameworks were established by then (see Appendix 1 for a summary of 
key policies and their main contents for the governance of GD-ETS). By 2017, GD-ETS had traded 158 
million tons of CO2 equivalent with total value of 3.72 billion RMB yuan (or 548 million USD), which 
takes over 35% of the total trade volume and market value of seven piloting programmes (Figure 2). 
GD-ETS hence is the largest carbon market among all the piloting localities.   
The design of any cap-and-trade system from scratch is a highly complicated undertaking as the 
literature highlighted above on market-making illustrates clearly. The building blocks of an ETS normally 
include the scope of industries to be covered, cap measurement methodologies, the allowance 
allocation mechanism, the MRV (monitoring, reporting and verification) system, compliance and penalty 
measures, and in some cases offset mechanisms. On top of these operational elements, a dedicated 
regulatory framework needs to be established. It should be mentioned that the basic infrastructure of 
Chinese ETS piloting programmes appears to be largely identical, since the design is mainly borrowed 
from the EU-ETS models. Our fieldwork also illustrates that experts from EU countries played a 
significant role during the preparation and initial stages of constructing the GD-ETS. However, in order 
to make sure the borrowed blueprint fitted with the actual local context, Guangdong province has 
implemented a series of innovative adjustments to almost every aspect of the ETS construction.  
4.1. Coverage and scope of capped industries and enterprises 
What type of activities and enterprises should be included in the cap-and-trade is the first challenge that 
designers of an ETS system needed to address. Each industry would need different methodologies to 
measure and report its emissions and some of these methodologies can be highly complicated and 
costly to design. Although the general policy goal is often to include as many emitting entities, choices 
need to be made based about the feasibility of doing this. Guangdong therefore chose four heavy 
industries (cement, electricity, steel, and petrol chemistry) to be included in the ETS experiment. All the 
enterprises with annual emissions over 20,000 tons of CO2 equivalent in these four industries (currently 
186 enterprises) are included, covering around 55% of total emissions in the province. GD-ETS has a 
7 
 
conservative approach to cover only the core emission industries with easier methodologies to measure 
and report emissions and the number of enterprises included in GD-ETS is considerably fewer 
compared to other piloting ETS. But this conservative approach ensures that appropriate 
methodologies are applied for measuring and calculating the emission cap, which is believed to be 
crucial to the operational stability of ETS at the initial stage. Meanwhile, Guangdong has been carrying 
out research on the methodologies for measuring GHG emissions in industries like ceramics, textiles, 
nonferrous metals, pulp and paper, building, logistics and transportation, and plastic chemistry.  
One distinctive element is that the majority of corporations within these core emission industries are 
state-owned enterprises, which represent Guangdong government’s ambition to be a leader in the 
Chinese ETS experiment especially around the issue of how to encourage SOEs’ emission reductions 
via market instruments, since SOEs are much less sensitive to the market signals and more keen to 
respond to political pressure (Shen, 2015). On the contrary, private companies are often smaller in size 
and more vulnerable to external policy changes. In addition, awareness among private companies of 
the potential for emissions reduction can be lower than for large SOEs. Therefore, the Guangdong 
government decided to encourage SOEs to enter the ETS experiments first, reflecting its rather 
distinctive protective tradition towards private and foreign enterprises.  
4.2. Cap on emissions: measurement and adjustment 
One of the common challenges for all the ETS designers in China is how to determine the caps, 
because China has not yet set any absolute targets for its emissions and neither have its local 
provinces. The most commonly seen targets are expressed in carbon intensity (the units of carbon 
emission to produce one unit of GDP) in national and local economic plans. The methodological 
challenge, therefore, is how to translate carbon intensity targets into the absolute emission caps for the 
industries to be included in the ETS. Basically, there are two alternatives given this background: set an 
absolute cap but allow it to increase based on the GDP rise, or make an intensity-based cap (Jiang et 
al, 2014). In the case of Guangdong, the 12th Five Year Plan (2010-2015) proscribed a 19% carbon 
intensity reduction by 2015 compared to 2010 level (People’s Government of Guangdong Province 
[PGGP], 2012). Based on this overall target and other industrial development plans within the province 
(reflecting a more top-down approach), combined with the historical emissions and average 
technological level of a given industry (embodying a more bottom-up approach), the absolute emission 
cap was worked out. 
Theoretically, there are two major problems for this methodological approach to determine the emission 
caps. First, the projected industrial output based on the historical figures can be highly inaccurate due 
to the economic fluctuation or other external factors. Second, the new production capacities added to 
the ETS each year can be hard to measure given the boundary and unit of measurement is 
corporations and enterprises, not individual facilities. Therefore, in the policy design, additional 
allowances are created and retained by the regulators, both for the new industrial facilities and for the 
adjustment purposes if market fluctuations are higher than expected (Table 1).  
One of the special features of GD-ETS is the flexible, transparent and cooperative approach adopted in 
determining its total emission cap. Capped enterprises are allowed to issue complaints regarding the 
methodology and provide suggestions for improvement. As a result, over 60% of capped enterprises 
raised complaints in 2013, and their opinions are largely incorporated into the final design of 
methodologies. During these interactions, surplus allowances were found (over 16 million tons of CO2 
equivalent) and collected from 61 enterprises, and insufficient allowances among 44 enterprises 
(around 4 million tons of CO2 equivalent) were re-supplied by the government.  
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4.3. Allowance distribution and allocation 
GD-ETS is the only piloting programme so far to insist on a combination of free allocation and an 
auction system for the allowance distribution. Theoretically, an allowance auction is the best way to 
identify the proper price for carbon emissions, which is the one of the basic objectives for the ETS 
experiment. But in reality, due to the resistance of the capped enterprises (as auctions will inevitably 
increase the cost to compliance), no other piloting ETS tried the auction option as systematically as 
GD-ETS. In 2013 and 2014, altogether 19 million tons of allowances of CO2 equivalent were distributed 
via auctions. As expected, the auction system was initially resisted by the capped enterprises, arguing 
that it would generate a profound impact on their cash flow. The argument is particularly acute when 
they are requested to purchase 3% of total auctioned allowance before acquiring the 97% of free 
allowances. This ‘compulsory’ auction approach was abandoned in 2014 and replaced by a more 
flexible approach. The companies are allocated with the free allowances first (ranging from 95 to 97%) 
and then given the autonomy to purchase the rest of the allowances either from the primary or 
secondary market. Such policy adjustments are particularly welcomed by the cement and steel 
industries, which face tremendous economic difficulties and claim they cannot afford lump sum 
payment of auctioned allowances. As for the revenues generated from the auctions, Guangdong’s 
NDRC established a dedicated low-carbon development fund for supporting low-carbon technology 
upgrade and innovation. The first trench of the funding amounting to 600 million RMB yuan is now 
available for low-carbon investment.  
For the allocation of free allowances, GD-ETS also exhibited a progressive approach that gradually 
replaced the historical approach to the benchmark approach to determine the allowance cap. The 
historical approach, namely projecting future emissions on a capped enterprise based on its previous 
emissions during a certain period of time, can be notoriously inaccurate. The macro-economic or 
industrial performance can be highly unstable and fall out of the projected trajectory. In addition, an 
historical approach can be unfair to those companies who already embarked on mitigation activities 
prior to the introduction of ETS, and discourage enterprises who wish to do so. However, an historical 
approach is a convenient choice for the regulators for its simplicity in operation and hence becomes a 
most common approach for most of the piloting ETS programmes. Set against the historical approach is 
the benchmark approach, namely to use certain products, technology and process as a baseline 
emission scenario for the given industry and allocate allowance accordingly to each enterprise. Such 
methods are obviously more stringent for enterprises with out-dated technology or production 
processes. However, setting appropriate benchmarks is technologically challenging and needs more 
accurate emissions data, which is hard to acquire at the initial stages. GD-ETS’ strategy is to apply both 
approaches at the beginning, but as more data are available more baselines of capped industries are 
developed and the benchmark approach has become more widely adopted. In some industries, such as 
cement and electricity generation, more than one set of baselines are developed.    
4.4. MRV and carbon accounting 
Accurate and authentic emission data is the prerequisite of any cap-and-trade system. GD-ETS 
established a comprehensive and stringent MRV system with relatively high technical and managerial 
standards. It appointed 29 independent, third party MRV entities from across the country to undertake 
MRV activities for the 190 or so capped enterprises. These activities are paid for by the provincial 
government to avoid fraud and deception that often arise when MRV activities are paid for by the 
capped enterprises themselves. In addition, constant trainings for the validators are organised to 
ensure their competence for various methodologies and industries. Since 2016, a dedicated 
9 
 
independent evaluation agency was established to review the MRV works randomly and to prevent 
fraud. The MRV results and emission reports are intensely monitored and constantly inspected under 
this institutional arrangement and the validators that are not meeting these standards are denied future 
MRV contracts. Recently, several validation companies were warned about the poor quality of their 
work and will be put on the black list if they fail to enhance their performance. 
Another challenge of regulating MRV activities in China is that most of the MRV works are carried out 
on the basis of a company, rather than on a project or facility basis as often seen in other major ETS 
around the world. This is because the emission data on individual facilities such as power plants or 
industrial factories are rare and hard to acquire. But several pilot ETS, namely Shanghai, Beijing and 
Guangdong, managed to include newly built facilities into the scope of MRV, which significantly 
enhanced the accuracy of the validation reports. Lastly, it should be noted that most of the MRV 
expertise and professionals in China’s carbon markets were developed to serve the CDM (Clean 
Development Mechanism) market in the form of DOEs (Designated Operational Entities) or project 
developers. Hence the large majority of these entities are based in Beijing and Shanghai. Guangdong 
province is relatively short of MRV expertise. Therefore, its regulators believe that stringent and specific 
MRV rules and guidelines would be helpful to cultivate its own carbon expertise. Such a policy goal is 
largely being achieved as the number of local MRV entities has increased in the past few years.   
4.5. Regulatory and market infrastructure 
GD-ETS is operated within a comprehensive regulatory framework (see Figure 4). Three distinctive 
features can be noted form this framework. First, top provincial leaders are involved and in charge of 
the top level institutions responsible for climate change and emission reductions. The provincial 
governor, the executive vice governor, and the head of Guangdong DRC, all have specific responsibility 
according to this institutional framework. Such arrangements exhibit the strong political commitment 
from the provincial leaders to tackle the problem of climate change, which urges lower level officers to 
treat the issue seriously. Second, a dedicated and permanent regulatory department, namely the 
Division of Responses to Climate Change, was established within Guangdong DRC to coordinate, 
supervise implementation, and regulate the emission reduction activities across the province, including 
the newly established ETS. Among all seven piloting localities only Hubei and Guangdong established 
such dedicated and permanent institutions for climate change issues. The field investigation revealed 
that such an arrangement is highly beneficial as dedicated climate officers often have a vision and 
ambition for the long-term growth of the carbon market, and are less likely subject to short term or 
instrumental interests, such as trading volume or market size. 
It is also noted Guangdong’s regulatory frameworks for its ETS is highly collaborative with non-state 
actors, particularly with the local academics and think tanks. During the preparation stage of GD-ETS, 
many academics were invited to join the policy design and evaluation works with the state officers. After 
the GD-ETS was launched, some of these academics were temporarily transferred as secondment 
employees of Guangdong DRC’s newly established Division of Responses to Climate Change. They 
work with the newly appointed climate officers together under the same roof and on a daily basis. Such 
close working relationships have even been legitimised as part of the formal institutional framework in 
the name of the GD-ETS working team. In addition, an Allowance Evaluation Committee (AEC) was 
established between climate officers, experts, and corporate stakeholders to oversee the process of 
allowance setting and distribution.   
As for the market institutions, the major innovation lies in the creation of dedicated finance institutions 
aiming to vitalising the secondary market and promoting market liquidity. One of the biggest challenges 
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for the piloting carbon market is the very low awareness and willingness among the enterprises to 
participate in the carbon trading (Shen, 2015). In Guangdong, dedicated carbon financing institutions 
and asset management companies has been introduced into the market to lower down the barrier for 
trading in the secondary market. Regulators encouraged innovative financial transactions such as buy-
back or mortgage deals so that the capped enterprises are allowed to sell or mortgage their carbon 
assets for the finance needed for low carbon technological upgrades. Consequently, the enterprises 
became more active and motivated in engaging the carbon market instead of trading permits only on 
the primary market before the cut-off date for the obligatory purposes.  
Another nascent institutional development is related to the on-going reforms of China’s electricity 
sectors since 2015. Although China has gone through several rounds of electricity sectoral reform in 
the past two decades with mixed results (Andrew-Speed, 2012), the recent restructuring focus has 
been the marketisation and privatisation of the sales department of state electricity utilities. In 
Guangdong alone, there are over 280 newly established companies dedicated for electricity sales and 
trade after the reforms takes off, and some of them exhibited tremendous interests in integrating 
electricity and carbon trading activities. Electricity sector is the largest segment of GD-ETS, and the 
closer linkage between the two markets would attracts more electricity utilities into the secondary 
market. However, it impose new challenges regarding the previous regulations on indirect emissions 
and baseline scenarios as explained in previous sections, which needs to further regulatory adjustment.        
4.6. Major outcomes of the local policy innovations 
By 2016, Guangdong has become the largest and most active piloting ETS programme in China both in 
terms of its trading volume (23.34 million tons of CO2 equivalent) and market value (around 42.5 million 
USD) (see Figure 5). The carbon price remains stable between 1.47 and 2.2 USD, without the abrupt 
price turbulence noted throughout the trading years (see Figure 6), indicating that most of the policy 
innovations mentioned in this section have generated lasting and positive impacts on market 
performance. For example, the auctions for allowance in 2016 are well accepted by market actors with 
more enthusiastic participation from both energy utilities and financial institutions. The shocks and 
impacts of these auctions on market performance are minimal. The successful institutionalisation of the 
auction system for allowance distribution is arguably one of the most important lessons learnt during 
the piloting stage.  
Another major achievement is from the wider adoption of the benchmark approach for counting the 
emissions of capped industries. By 2016, over 90% of the capped industries are using baselines rather 
than historical data for allowance setting. As described earlier, this benchmark approach seemed to be 
challenging at the initial stage amid fears it might deter some industries from being included in the ETS 
for their lack of appropriate methodology to set the baselines. Yet it appears to have enhanced the 
fairness and hence produce positive incentives among the capped enterprises to engage in carbon 
trading activities in the long run. Lastly, the intensive collaborations between state and non-state 
stakeholders helped to create a transparent policy environment. Guangdong ETS has an effective 
policy release and announcement system to prevent information leakage to the market. In general, 
these policy experiments show that while Guangdong had a slow start at the initial stage of market 
development, establishing sustainable rules for long-term market growth has paid off.       
5. Implications for the local Innovations in GD-ETS experiment 
In the previous section, the overview of the institutional and policy development of GD-ETS was 
presented. It was noted that from almost every aspect of the construction of a cap-and-trade 
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system, innovative measures were developed to facilitate the design and operation of the piloting 
ETS programme. In this section, the theoretical and empirical implications of these innovations 
are analysed.  
5.1. Local experiments in non-economic policy domains 
One of the major differences between piloting ETS programs compared to most previous local 
policy experiments is that it they constitute a non-economic experiment aiming to curbing carbon 
emissions in a cost-effective manner, whereas early experiments were usually developed to 
promote local economic growth. Therefore, most of the early local policy experiments were often 
economically driven and developed in a bottom-up fashion, and usually widely supported by the 
local stakeholders who wished to economically benefit from these marketisation experiments 
(Heilmann, 2008a). The political barriers for these early experiments are often not from the local 
level, therefore, but from the top and senior officers who are more sceptical or ambivalent about 
market oriented reforms for normative and ideological reasons. In such cases patronage within 
the higher level officialdom who support these local experiments is often crucial for the successful 
implementation of these experiments (Heilmann, 2008b).  
However, when the piloting programs and local experiments moved into the non-economic policy 
domains, the power dynamics and interest configurations changed significantly. First, lacking 
obvious local economic benefits, it is difficult to win support for these experiments from local 
stakeholders. Taking emission trading as an example, China in the past decades has launched 
several piloting emission trading schemes for SO2 in various localities but with little success (Gao 
et al, 2009). One of the reasons for these failures is the lack of enthusiasm among the capped 
enterprises to participate in the trading (Shin, 2013). As a result, the key to the success of piloting 
programs is no-longer determined by patron relations with top political officers, but by local 
willingness to embark on the experiments sincerely. Such a change of power dynamics is driving 
climate officers to design relatively benign policy or measures to attract enterprises into the ETS 
programmes, particularly at the initial stage of experiment. This is the main reason why most of 
the policy innovations around the crucial aspects of the ETS, such as allowance calculation and 
distribution, the penalty system and MRV, are not designed in the most stringent manner among 
most of the piloting localities across China. A balance needs to be maintained for local policy 
makers between meeting top-down political commands and accommodating and negotiating with 
local corporate interests.   
5.2. Level of marketisation, local economic development and political culture 
The attitude and preferences of local policy makers, caught between the divided interests of 
central officers and local business, have become crucial in shaping the outcome of innovative 
policy and institutional design. There are countless studies of China’s environmental governance 
arguing that local government officials systematically prioritise local economic development and 
deter, often implicitly, the environmental regulations from the top (Eaton and Kostka, 2014), 
leading to the failures of this command-and-control model (Breslin 2007; Economy 2004; Ho, 
2006; Mol and Carter, 2006). Such understandings, though accurately identified as the root 
causes of many environmental crises in China, have yet to capture the recent attitude changes 
among local policy makers under increasing pressure both from Beijing and local societies in 
dealing with daunting environmental challenges within their political domain in the past decade. In 
this regard, even the piloting of ETS as a market instrument may not fundamentally replace the 
previous ‘command and control’ mode of environmental governance in China, as other scholars 
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have pointed out (Lo, 2013). It may provide ambitious localities with the means to move towards  
more progressive and environmentally friendly institutional arrangements and policy frameworks 
out of the existing governance structure. The question is, therefore, what factors enable local 
policy makers to adopt a more pro-climate attitude rather than one more narrowly focussed only 
on growth?  
Our field work reveals that, although in general local policy makers would not want to scare away 
enterprises by making and enforcing stringent rules, to some extent local governments did press 
business to comply with the requirements. In addition, the local economic and political context 
clearly affects the form, direction and nature of policy and institutional innovation. In this case 
study, Guangdong, as the forerunner of Chinese economic reforms, exhibited a rather strong 
ambition to establish a long-lasting and well-functioning ETS programme. At the outset, the 
provincial leaders and their climate officers were truly convinced of the urgency and necessity for 
Guangdong, a relatively affluent, economically developed, high-emission province, to treat climate 
change issues as a real and long-term challenge. Therefore, although ETS experiments are 
handed down from higher level officials in a top-down manner, Guangdong officers did not treat it 
as a mere political task, and its policy making is not purely motivated by pleasing the higher level 
officers. Instead, it focuses on its own needs for low-carbon transformation, and the policy design 
and regulatory frameworks are reconciled with the demand for long-term stability and securing 
benefits for the ETS and its future development.  
Consequently, some relatively stringent policy innovations can be noted in GD-ETS, such as 
insisting on allowance auctions, efforts to develop complicated carbon accounting methodologies 
for various industries, preferring baseline approaches over historical approaches for allowance 
distribution, and adopting a rather stringent MRV system. All these measures are particularly 
difficult to get accepted by the business communities and consequently largely abandoned by 
most other piloting programs. Yet Guangdong implemented all these seemingly challenging 
measures in the belief of their long-term value for a well-functioned carbon market. These 
measures inevitably encounter resistance from business communities. But instead of 
compromising the policy design, the Guangdong government sought to mitigate this resistance by 
enhancing the flexibility of the policy, the transparency of governance, and through intensive 
communications with the stakeholders. For example, the allowance auction, as one of the most 
sensitive policy issues, has been fiercely deterred by the capped enterprises due to its impact on 
some companies’ cash flow (Liu et al, 2016). These complaints were soon assimilated by the 
policy makers, however, to optimise the auction system for the next year (2014-2015), including 
adjusting the floor price and differentiating industries for the proportion of auctioned allowances. 
Meanwhile, since many capped companies are questioning the usage of the fund collected from 
the allowance auctions, a dedicated measure regarding the management of this fund was passed 
in 2014 to enhance transparency. Some of these policy alterations inevitably led to market 
fluctuations that received further criticism from some academics and market participants, but the 
policy learning process based on intensive communications between regulators and market 
participants proved to be valuable for the enhancement of the overall performance of GD-ETS in 
the long run. 
6. Conclusion:  
In this article, we provide an overview of the innovative policies, measures and institutional 
arrangements that were developed to construct, negotiate and implement a local piloting cap-and-
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trade schemes in Guangdong province. Through this case study we argued that China’s piloting 
programmes in the climate governance domain are very different to previous local experiments 
aimed at promoting economic growth. Pilot ETSs are implemented in a top-down fashion and 
therefore often encounter opposition from local business communities. Local governments are 
caught between the political ambition to address climate change issues from the top, and local 
business interests that are keen to maintain the status quo. Most of the policy and institutional 
innovations aim to reconcile this conflict of objectives (Shen, 2015). In this regard, the introduction 
of market instruments for climate change governance has not yet bridged the gap between policy 
making at the central level and policy implementation at the local level, which has long haunted 
China’s environmental governance.  
However, from the case study of GD-ETS we can also observe how determination on the part of 
local government to tackle climate change can strongly shape the outcome of innovative 
measures. This is a function of the emission and pollution profile of the locality, its stage of 
development and degree of marketisation, and the political culture among local bureaucracies. 
The comparatively stringent but transparent rules and institutions found in GD-ETS reflect this 
locality’s urgent need for emission reductions and pollution control as a highly industrialised 
province, its relatively liberalised tradition and political economy, and more open minded 
regulators. Therefore, it would be challenging to generalise all these innovations when considering 
the construction of a national carbon market, because the economic and political contexts in other 
parts of the country are very different to those which prevail in Guangdong province. One of the 
key implications of this study is that besides the other challenges of constructing a national cap-
and-trade system, such as lack of comprehensive legal frameworks, weak enforcement and 
under-developed MRV systems, and low awareness and wiliness to engage among enterprises 
(Lo, 2016; Zhang, 2015), this study points out another concern regarding the highly unbalanced 
development stages and variant political cultures and traditions across the country that will shape 
the performance of a united carbon market. Previously, no other regional carbon markets, 
including the EU-ETS, have had to face such dramatic political and economic differences among 
its members within the scheme.   
To conclude, some of GD-ETS’ innovation can be highly applicable to other highly industrialised 
provinces or cities with a relatively open political culture. Yet establishing an equally stringent and 
transparent system at nationwide level can be difficult when other provinces may not face the 
same urgent needs for emission reductions as Guangdong province. For some areas in China, 
poverty alleviation, industrialisation and urbanisation, and economic development remain at the 
top of political agenda, and many local officers are keen to adhere to the traditional corporatist 
culture (Dickson, 2008) to govern private sectors. In this regard, an internal separation between 
‘developed provinces’ and ‘developing provinces’ in the national ETS can be helpful, when the 
industrialised and marketised provinces are required to contribute more for the emission 
reduction, and industrialising provinces can contribute by providing carbon offsets. Such an 
arrangement could draw upon the experience of Kyoto Protocol, which separates Annex-1 and 
non-Annex 1 countries with different roles. However, demarcating lines of responsibility among 
various provinces brings with it other political challenges.  
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